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Must There Be Basic Action?* (forthcoming in Nous) 
Douglas Lavin 
Harvard University 
 
Although a divine agent can perhaps simply say “Let there be light” and thus 
there is light, our sort of life is a bit more of a struggle, requiring us to do 
various things in order to get much of anything done. Consider illuminating 
a room, building a house, or baking a cake. How do we execute complex 
projects such as these? The answer, says contemporary action theory, is that 
we perform complex actions by performing a more or less intricate sequence 
of basic actions, while we perform basic actions immediately, directly or “just 
like that.” Arthur Danto gave early expression to this way of thinking about 
the structure of action: “A basic action is perfectly simple in the same sense in 
which the old ‘simple ideas’ were said to be: they were not compounded out 
of anything more elementary than themselves, but were instead the ultimately 
simple elements out of which other ideas were compounded.”1 The thought 
here is that the practically complex resolves into the practically simple as a 
digital image resolves into a highly structured set of color points, or as a 
digital recording resolves into a series of discrete sonic atoms. And my aim 
in this paper is to raise some doubts about this practical atomism and to say 
something about why it matters whether it is true. 
  Dependence, mediacy, and complexity are abstract concepts, as are their 
complementary opposites, independence, immediacy, and simplicity. The 
determinate conception we have to do with here is of an instrumentally 
or teleologically basic action: very roughly, an action is basic in this sense 
when no means are taken in its execution, or equally, when it is not the end 
of any other action. The concept figures in the description of the structure of 
getting something done, specifically of getting something done on purpose or 
intentionally, and thus also in the description of the agent’s point of view on 
the structure of his own efficacy. The agent so depicted understands himself 
as doing whatever he does through the performance of basic actions, with all  
the rest derived from these. Means-end rationality expands our sphere 
of influence and massively extends our reach—there are flags on the moon 
and at the bottom of the sea!—but it is precisely at the inner limit of this 
teleological order that a rational agent’s power to make a dent in things is 
genuinely displayed. Where means-end rationality comes to a close, efficacy (author’s draft – copy editing, formatting etc. still underway) 
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genuinely begins: this is where the conceptual rubber is supposed to hit the 
material road, in the things one does without thought about how they get 
done. Sometimes it is said there is a spark of the divine in this. My own view 
is the opposite, that there is at best only a shadow of the brute.2 
  The idea of basic action is a fixed point in the contemporary investigation 
of the nature of action. And while there are arguments aimed at putting the 
idea in place, it is meant to be closer to a gift of common sense than to a 
hard-won achievement of philosophical reflection. It first appears at the stage 
of innocuous description and before the announcement of philosophical 
positions. And yet, as any decent magician knows, the real work so often 
gets done in the set-up. I argue that the seemingly innocent idea of basic 
action is, in fact, bound up with a wide-spread conception of the nature of 
bodily or physical action (section 3). Its legitimacy is vital to the intelligibility 
of the causal theory of action, according to which physical action consists of 
a mere event and a condition of mind joined (in the right way) by the bond of 
causality. Left unchecked, means-end reason threatens to permeate physical 
action, and thus threatens the sovereignty of the sphere of material events 
at the center of the causal theory: such events, including the movements of 
one’s body when one intentionally moves it, are thought to be constitutively 
independent of the subject’s rational capacities. Basic action is a necessary 
countermeasure, a sort of metaphysical containment wall needed to preserve 
the separate jurisdictions of the mind of the acting subject and what merely 
happens. 
  I argue that so long as action theory proceeds under the assumption that 
there must be basic action, it must regard our relation to the progress of 
our own deeds as not different in principle from Marx’s understanding of 
the relation of the non-worker (Nichtarbeiter) to the material processes that 
realize his own ideas, namely the work done on the factory floor.3 Each is 
alienated from the progress, or getting done, of his deeds. In each the process 
of doing something intentionally turns out to be a case of delegating tasks 
to another power. How the process comes to completion is not willed, and 
at best watched: the causal work is not the agent’s work, his knowledge not 
self-knowledge (section 5). We should find this unacceptable. And if this is 
right, it should be a pressing question whether there must be basic action. I 
argue that we have no good reason to think so: basic action is not forced on 
us by argument (sections 2 and 4). It is open to us to consider an alternative, 
one on which action is not, in the fundamental case, barren of means-end (author’s draft – copy editing, formatting etc. still underway) 
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structure, but instead permeated by it: we register as a force in nature not at 
the limit of the means-end order but precisely in its constitution. 
  This change of orientation has general implications for the metaphysics 
of agency, not simply because it disturbs the foundation of the causal theory, 
but because it is itself a partial articulation of a conception of action as 
a categorically distinctive form of event or process. Here doing something 
intentionally is not an event of some generic kind with certain special causes, 
but instead an event that is inextricably both material and conceptual. In 
giving up on basic action, the means-end order is shown to be at once an 
order of causality (the means realize the end) and an order of reason (the 
end rationalizes the means). And this order, an order of practical reason, 
is shown to be internal to what happens, to the progress of the deed itself. 
However, I do not get much beyond ground clearing here. 
 
1. What is Basic Action? 
The expression “basic action” is plainly a term of art. Many meanings have 
been attached to it. I do not want to quarrel over its use. And I do not 
want to deny that there are legitimate sources of the widespread, though 
sometimes inchoate, intuition that there are or must be elementary practical 
operations, “basic actions”—things we do “just like that”—in some sense or 
other. (I say something about these sources and the specific ideas they lead 
to in section 4). Nevertheless, I will be concerned with a very specific idea 
answering to the expression: it is the idea of teleological basicness.4 What I 
propose to do now is to isolate this conception of an elementary practical 
operation. 
  I move my finger, flip the switch, turn on the light, and illuminate the 
room. This might be a report of four independent actions, an undifferentiated 
bundle or mere aggregate (A, B, C, D). Or it might be a report of a temporal 
sequence of otherwise independent actions, like entries in a diary (A and 
then B, B and then . . . ). But we do not have the case as Donald Davidson 
imagines it, and as it concerns us here, unless these are bound together as 
the elements of an explanatory order of means and ends: I do A, I do B, 
and, moreover, doing the one accounts for doing the other. Among actions 
so related, the end is why the means are taken (Why are you flipping the 
switch? I’m flipping it in order to turn on the light), and the means are 
how the end is realized (How are you turning on the light? I’m turning 
it on by flipping the switch). The question “Why?” that elicits the meansend (author’s draft – copy editing, formatting etc. still underway) 
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order bears Anscombe’s special sense and is tied to a certain sense of 
“How?”, a question also eliciting that order and also articulating the point 
of view of the agent, though here not on the agent’s reasons but on his 
efficacy.5 
  Basic action is a limit on this rational order of means and ends. It can be 
described from either side of the relation. Through the concept of an end: 
a basic action is not the end of any other action; nothing else is done in 
order to do it; it is not an answer to “Why?” when asked about any other 
action. And equally through the concept of a means: no means are taken in 
the execution of a basic action; it is not done by doing anything else; there is 
no answer to “How?” when asked of it. I illuminated the room by means of 
turning on the light, turned on the light by flipping the switch, and flipped 
the switch by moving my finger, but maybe moving my finger is something I 
simply did, something which did not involve taking any steps or means, or 
again doing anything with a view to moving my finger? If so, it is a basic 
action: That X is doing/did A is basic just when there is no A∗ such that X is 
doing/did A∗ in order to do A; or again, That X is doing/did A is basic just 
when there is no A∗ such that X is doing/did A by means of doing A∗. 
Quite generally, rational agency is the capacity to apply thought to action: 
it is the capacity to do things for reasons or on the basis of considerations. In 
the canonical formulation of the consideration on which an agent acts, the 
agent is described as thinking that there is something about doing A and in 
light of this does A. In the specific case of instrumental agency, the thought 
about A is always that it has some relation to B, something else the agent 
aims to do, say, that it will be sufficient for doing B, or that it is necessary 
for doing B, or even only that it will facilitate doing B.6 Since a basic action 
is, by definition, not mediated by the performance of any other action, it is 
not mediated by any such thought—thought about how to bridge the gap 
between here, where one has not yet done what one aims to do, and there, 
where one has brought things to completion. With basic action, thought 
about how to realize the end in question gives out—one acts immediately, 
directly or “just like that.” 
  The classification of actions into the basic and the non-basic is not meant 
to be merely one among many ways of carving up what is done intentionally, 
as are classifications of actions according to whether or not one is done with 
the eyes open or on Tuesday. The classification is meant to be one we must 
recognize if we are to understand the very structure of intentionally doing (author’s draft – copy editing, formatting etc. still underway) 
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something: whatever large-scale projects one has realized though the ordering 
of means to ends, one must eventually reach a fine enough resolution and 
come upon things that have been done without any thought about how to 
get them done. This bare-bones depiction of the structure of practical or 
productive consciousness is not meant to be, in the first place, the upshot of 
theoretical investigation, but instead part of the pre-theoretical scaffolding 
on which our researches into the nature of action take shape: its apparently 
unproblematic inevitability rests on its being placed among the innocent 
preliminaries. The model is pervasive. But does it really have all the authority 
of common sense? 
 
2. A Preliminary Challenge: Find the Basic Action 
When I think about my own case, I have to confess that I have a hard time 
finding the basic ones. What have I done just like that? 
  Suppose I am on the road to Kathmandu with Donald Davidson. “Stop! 
Don’t turn left. We’ve got to go this way,” I say, pointing to our position on 
the map, Chitwan, and then tracing the improbably straight path, arranged 
for philosophical purposes, of an unnamed road all the way to Kathmandu. 
What is the basic action in all this? Now, I intentionally moved my finger 
along the line from Chitwan to Kathmandu. And I also have moved my finger 
from Chitwan to here, Hetauda, which is halfway along the route. Indeed, I 
did this intentionally and with a view to moving it to Kathmandu. But of 
course I have also moved my finger from Chitwan to here, mid-point on the 
way to Hetauda. And why shouldn’t it also be that I did this intentionally 
and with a view to moving it to Hetauda and so in order to move it to 
Kathmandu? After all if you point it out, I won’t say “I didn’t know I was”, 
and moreover I will be able to give the reason why I was doing it. And, now, 
what is to prevent us from applying this procedure again and again without 
end, each time isolating some initial segment of a movement and showing it 
to be something I did with a view to bringing off the whole?7 
  The general challenge here is to take some actual intentional action A, 
an action performed on a particular occasion, and to point to one of its 
basic parts. The difficulty is to find a describable part of A, A∗, which is 
something the agent did intentionally in order to do A, but which does not 
itself resolve into further sub-actions that the agent did intentionally in order 
to do A∗. This challenge to find the basic action is not meant to be decisive, 
only suggestive, and to get us to wonder about the ground of our confidence (author’s draft – copy editing, formatting etc. still underway) 
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that there is or must be basic action. If one does wonder, as I do, then the 
situation looks like this: there is a general philosophical consensus that basic 
action is the core of any action whatsoever, yet it is difficult, or at least more 
difficult than one might have expected, to discern particular cases of basic 
action. This forces the question why exactly we think that there is or must be 
basic action in the first place. What is supposed to convince us of this thing 
that we can’t exactly find when we go looking for it? Before looking into 
the reasons and arguments, however, I want to say something about why we 
might care about this. 
 
3. What Merely Happens 
The only feature of contemporary action theory as pervasive as the idea 
of basic action is the use of Wittgenstein’s question to set the terms of the 
discussion: “Let us not forget this: when ‘I raise my arm’, my arm goes up. 
And the problem arises: What is left over if I subtract the fact that my arm 
goes up from the fact that I raise my arm?”8 For our purposes, whether 
Wittgenstein sincerely means to answer it does not matter; what matters is 
the widespread tendency to pursue the investigation of action through it. 
It matters because the question itself forces a certain shape on subsequent 
reflection. It insists that the theory of action be a search for a solution to 
this equation: action (or again, doing something intentionally) consists of a 
not-intrinsically-intentional physical event, a mere happening, occurring in a 
context where certain further facts obtain. 
  In physical or bodily action things happen in the objective world: when I 
raise my arm, my arm goes up, and when I move a book, the book moves. My 
arm’s going up, the book’s moving—these are, of course, physical happenings, 
elements of the observable world of matter in motion. A presupposition 
of Wittgensteinian arithmetic is that such happenings are constitutively independent 
of a subject’s rational capacities—they are what they are regardless 
of what or whether anyone thinks.9 The material processes underway or 
happening when one is acting, especially including the movements of one’s 
body when one is intentionally moving it, are not intrinsically intentional. 
Rational purposiveness is to be understood in terms of their standing in 
external relations to something else. Indeed, very much of the dispute within 
mainstream action theory is over how to specify the something else (beliefs, 
desires, intentions, policies, acts of will, the agent herself, others?), and how 
to characterize the sort of relation (event causal, agent causal, triggering, (author’s draft – copy editing, formatting etc. still underway) 
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structuring, sustaining, others?) joining this to what merely happens. 
  The standard story of action says: I raised my arm when my arm’s rising 
is caused in the right way by certain psychological occurrences with relevant 
contents. Here is Michael Smith: “Actions are those bodily movements that 
are caused and rationalized by a pair of mental states: a desire for some 
end, where ends can be thought of as ways the world could be, and a belief 
that something the agent can just do, namely, move her body in the way 
to be explained, has some suitable chance of making the world the relevant 
way.”10 The standard story operates with a generic conception of the 
causal order, the order in which things happen because of other things. It 
aims at an understanding of acting, making things happen for reasons, as 
a matter of certain elements being related in the only way that bears on 
why anything happens. There are many, like Smith, who think a psychology 
of beliefs and desires is too impoverished to account for some of the more 
sophisticated manifestations of our own agency, but who are nevertheless 
committed to this naturalistic agenda and who proceed by extending the 
initial model, typically by supplementing the kinds of psychological occurrence 
that figure as causes.11 The typical complaint about the standard story 
(and any of its extensions) is that it leaves the agent out—depicting only 
a locus of psychological transactions but not a genuine source of reasoned 
activity—and thus cannot capture the essentially self-determined character 
of doing something intentionally. Non-standard stories of action hope to offer 
a corrective by placing something irreducibly “active” at the origin of 
the physical happening and say: I raised my arm when my arm’s rising is 
caused in the right way by an act of will or by the agent himself. Here is John 
Bishop: “All intentional actions have a component which is a basic action, 
and it is here that the agent-causalist professes to find an irreducible causal 
relation between agent and event.”12 But whatever the specific disputes, the 
parties to them share a generic conception of a material process or event 
(the conditions of identity and individuation are free of intentionality) and 
the explanatory ambition of fitting action into a world of material processes 
so understood. And thus they share an allegiance to the very general 
framework of the causal theory of action: that X did A intentionally is the 
arithmetic sum of what merely happens and something else. 
  Anyone familiar with the literature in this part of action theory, the part 
representing standard and non-standard stories, should be struck by the 
ubiquity of appeal to the notion of basic action. It seems to sit at the center (author’s draft – copy editing, formatting etc. still underway) 
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of these otherwise very different pictures of the constitution of physical 
action. Consider the passage from Smith above. What an agent “can just 
do” is what an agent can do without having to take any intentional steps 
or means: the performance of such a thing is (typically) a basic action in 
our sense. Whatever modifications might be made to the standard story, and 
however sophisticated it might become, what is crucial for our purposes is 
that basic action remains the fundamental manifestation of agency. And, 
as the passage from Bishop indicates, the concept of basic action is not 
simply a tool for those who build upon the standard story.13 Indeed, the 
dispute between standard and non-standard stories is about whether we can 
do without the metaphysical extravagance of an act of will or the agent in 
our understanding of basic action. In such a case, is the source or cause of 
what happens a complex of psychological states and events, an act of will, or 
simply the agent herself? The problem of action is here the problem of basic 
action, and the philosophy of action the philosophy of basic action. 
  Why do those who hold a decompositional conception of action so consistently 
appeal to basic action? Why, that is, do they consistently think that 
the fundamental manifestation of agency appears at the inner limit of the 
rational ordering of means and ends? I believe this correlation is not an 
accident. Basic action in our specifically teleological sense does crucial and 
indispensible work for the causal theory: the viability of the conception of 
physical action as a composite of an independently intelligible external happening 
and further conditions depends on the availability of the concept of 
basic action. If the connection has hardly been discussed, that is only because 
dependence on something regarded as so innocent can hardly register 
as a topic for explicit reflection. It is important to articulate the connection 
nevertheless. 
  The currency of our ordinary representation of action is a certain class of 
simple sentences (e.g. “Jones turned on the light,” “I am making an omelet”) 
in which the representation of an act-form (“to turn on the light,” “to make 
an omelet”) is immediately joined to the representation of an agent (“Jones,” 
“I”). These are, after all, terms in which we ask and answer the reason-seeking 
why-question (I did A. Why? I am doing B.) and the efficacy-articulating 
how-question (I am doing B. How? I am doing A). Now, the causal theorist 
is happy to speak in such terms for ordinary purposes. But how are we to understand 
them?What are the fundamental commitments implicit in such talk 
and thought? Of course, the causal theorist resists taking ordinary reports of (author’s draft – copy editing, formatting etc. still underway) 
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doing something intentionally to be representations of a distinct, intrinsically 
intentional form of material process. Davidson warns us, for example, not 
to be deceived by the adverbial form of “intentionally”: “intentional actions 
are not a class of actions [or movements], or, to put the point a little differently, 
doing something intentionally is not a manner of doing it.”14 Common 
thought and talk of action concerns, instead, what merely happens and further 
conditions. But since ordinary practical representations do not explicitly 
mention or refer to what merely happens—sometimes called the “result of” 
or “event intrinsic to” an action—the first step in subjecting action to a 
decompositional analysis is to isolate this element. And my thought is that 
without basic action this crucial first step could not be taken: a residue of intentionality 
would always remain in the representation of material processes 
themselves, of movements as movements. It will not be possible to realize the 
explanatory ambition of the causal theory, namely to fit action into a world 
that does not contain intrinsically intentional material processes, unless basic 
action is the fundamental manifestation of rational agency. 
  What does it consist in that X did A when this is a non-basic action? 
On anyone’s view, it consists in X’s having done other thing(s) intentionally; 
these subordinate actions, the means, are that through which X did A. 
There are different forms of means-end connection, or ways in which means 
contribute to the realization of an end. In one sort of case, the staple of contemporary 
action theory’s diet of examples, someone does something that, 
in the circumstances, is enough to do some other thing, e.g. Jones flipped 
the switch and in so doing he turned on the light. In another sort of case, 
that X did A (non-basically) consists in a series of actions no one of which 
is enough for success: I broke some eggs into a bowl, seasoned and stirred, 
then I poured the mixture into a pan, I let it sit for one minute, added 
cheese and scallion, and then flipped the egg pancake . . . et cetera, voila. I 
made an omelet in doing these other things. Now, it would not discharge 
the causal theorist’s burden of isolating what merely happens simply to point 
out that when Jones turned on the light intentionally, the light’s going on 
was caused by Jones’ intention to turn on the light. For this causal connection 
rests on the following connection: Jones flipped the switch intentionally 
with the result that the light went on. Likewise it would not discharge the 
causal theorist’s burden simply to point out that an omelet’s coming into 
existence was caused by the agent’s intention to make an omelet. For again 
this causal connection rests on complex connections between the several intentional (author’s draft – copy editing, formatting etc. still underway) 
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actions that contribute to the omelet making. In each case, the 
analysis of non-basic action has left us with an unanalyzed residue that itself 
consists of one or more intentional actions. Thus the causal theorist has not 
yet isolated the not-intrinsically-intentional events whose causation in the 
right way can constitute intentional action. If all actions were non-basic, 
the causal theorist’s analytical strategy would never yield what the theory 
demands: a mere happening whose causation by certain conditions of mind 
is acting intentionally. 
  Basic action is what stops this regress. If “X did A” reports a basic action, 
then, ex hypothesi, X’s doing A does not involve X’s having done anything else 
intentionally. Here, finally, we have an action which might itself be identified 
with non-intentional movement caused by thought. Here, we reach a practical 
atom, something that might be shown to stand as the correlate of a mere 
happening. Of course, with the basic case in place the causal theory will extend 
the analysis by describing how non-basic action ultimately decomposes 
into an aggregate of basic actions, caused by intentions with such-and-such 
contents, which can themselves be decomposed into independently intelligible, 
metaphysically independent, internal and external elements, the mind of 
the acting subject and what merely happens.15 
  Let me step back from the details of the argument to say in very rough 
terms why I take the idea of basic action to come so naturally to those 
who think of material processes or movements in general, and thus of such 
movements as figure in physical action, as constitutively independent of 
thought. In general, philosophical conceptions of the objective, material 
world tend to proceed in parallel with conceptions of human subjectivity 
and the mind. The generic conception of a material process which makes 
the decompositional conception of intentional action seem compulsory is 
reflected in a certain conception of the mind, specifically of the mind in a 
practical relation to the world. Here, thought or reason must stop short of 
movement itself: it cannot reach all the way into the constitution of what 
happens.16 If the jurisdiction of practical thought must be so limited, so must 
the jurisdiction of specifically instrumental thought, the rational ordering of 
means to ends—there must be basic action. 
 
4. Must There be Basic Action? 
In section 2, I questioned the force of arguments for basic action that appeal 
to a putatively direct and intuitive awareness of them. But the deep attraction (author’s draft – copy editing, formatting etc. still underway) 
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of the thought that there are basic actions comes from elsewhere. It stems, I 
think, from a sense that there must be, if there is to be any action at all: some 
of my actions depend on others for their occurrence, but not every action 
can depend on another, on pain of regress. But what exactly is the regress, 
and why is it vicious? 
  In this section, I consider two attempts to develop the thought that basic 
action is necessary to halt a regress. On the first, the need for basic action 
grows out of reflection on the causal character of certain action concepts. On 
the second, the need for basic action grows out of reflection on the general 
character of practical cognition. In response to each, I want to agree that the 
regress argument locates a genuinely attractive idea, one that might answer 
to a sense that there must be elementary practical operations of some sort or 
other. But I then want to claim that the regress argument does not establish 
that there must be basic action in our specifically teleological sense and thus 
cannot do the metaphysical work required by the causal theory. 
 
The regress of causes 
Sometimes an agent’s doing something (the officer sank the Bismarck) can 
be understood as her causing something to happen (the officer caused the 
Bismarck’s sinking), where this can be understood in terms of a relation 
between action and upshot—her doing something caused a certain event (the 
Bismarck’s sinking). But what did she do? The officer launched a torpedo; 
that is what caused the Bismarck’s sinking. Yet here again an agent’s doing 
something (the officer launched a torpedo) can be understood as her causing 
something to happen (the officer caused the torpedo’s launching), where this 
is to be understood in terms of a relation between her doing something and 
some separable upshot (the torpedo’s launching). But what did she do? The 
officer pushed a button; that is what caused the torpedo’s launching. 
Let’s say the following: where an action (X did A) can be analyzed 
in terms of a causal connection between another action and some external 
result (X did B and that caused E to happen), X did A causally-depends 
on X did B. And so, in our maritime narrative above, sinking the 
Bismarck causally-depends on launching the torpedo, and launching the torpedo 
causally-depends on pushing the button. Let’s suppose that this last 
is not causally-dependent on some further action. In any case, the regress 
argument only insists that there must be some limit to the chain of causal-dependencies: 
where action causally-depends on action, there must be action (author’s draft – copy editing, formatting etc. still underway) 
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that does not.17 
  The threat the regress poses is not simply that if performing an action 
would require performing infinitely many actions none would be possible. 
Here’s an analogy. One mode of acquiring private property is by gift. (“It’s 
mine because you gave it to me.”) Since this involves objects that are already 
someone’s property, there can be chains of acquisition by gift. (“It was yours 
to give because it had been given to you by so-and-so, and it was so-and-so’s 
because . . . .”) Such chains cannot go on forever, not because this would 
involve too many acts of giving, but because the intelligibility of any single 
act depends on another mode of acquisition—it is an essentially derivative 
ground of ownership. The spirit of our regress of causes is similar. In causally-dependent 
action we have an essentially derivative form of an agent’s owning 
(up to) what happens, an essentially derivative form of crediting a person 
with that. 
  It can seem like a merely technical point to say that with causally-dependent 
action X’s causing is just a matter of X’s action’s causing, but 
here the remoteness of the agent from what happens really is quite vivid. The 
subjects of causally derivative action, like the domino artist and the poor 
souls inhabiting Rube Goldberg’s cartoons, exploit causal chains spooling 
out from more immediate interventions in the world as a way of realizing 
their aims. Once our naval officer has, say, pushed the button, the causal 
chain unfolds according to its own principles. The subsequent accumulation 
of things she can be said to have done (launching the torpedo, sinking the 
Bismarck) does not involve any further contribution or effort. She could 
just as well be dead as the causal order of events marches along, now under 
its own steam, toward the external result (the torpedo’s launching, the 
Bismarck’s sinking).18 Such things are “up to nature,” but there must be 
something else, something up to me, at the origin of any domino cascade if 
what subsequently happens can be put down to me, even if only by courtesy. 
  Now, someone may want to exercise the prerogative of terminology and insist 
that we call “basic action” whatever limits a series of causal-dependencies. 
This is fine. What matters for our purposes is only whether the regress argument 
establishes that there must be basic action in our specifically teleological 
sense. The crucial question is whether the following is true: If X did A is a 
limit to a series of causal-dependencies (i.e. cannot be analyzed as X did A∗ 
and that caused E to happen), then there is no A∗ such that X did A∗ in 
order to do A. It does not. (author’s draft – copy editing, formatting etc. still underway) 
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  Return to our highly circumscribed adventure at sea: the officer pushed the 
button and that caused the torpedo’s launching and the Bismarck’s sinking; 
and thus she launched the torpedo and sank the Bismarck. Now, it does 
not unsettle the supposition that pushing the button is causally independent 
when we add that the officer took some preparatory steps, say, that she broke 
the glass seal in order to push the button. Consider some further variations: 
The officer pressed the button for 30 seconds and that caused . . . ; The officer 
pressed the button three times and that caused . . . ; The officer pressed three 
buttons sequentially and that caused, and so on. Let’s suppose pushing the 
button (for 30 seconds, three times, . . . and then that button and finally that 
other one) involved the deployment of means: she pressed (for 15 seconds . . . , 
the first time . . . , the first button . . . ) in order to realize the relevant whole. 
It is plain that we are not thereby in a position to analyze, say, her act of 
pushing three buttons in terms of a causal relation between her pushing the 
first one and its result. The presence of teleological structure does not deprive 
the respective acts of button pushing of being what brings a series of causally-dependent 
actions to an end and of being what sets the relevant chain of 
events in motion. The regress of causes does not force us to basic action.19 
 
The limits of practical cognition 
I would like to turn to another sort of regress argument, one which grows 
out of reflection on practical cognition. The rough idea is that some things 
are done on the basis of thought about how to do them, but these must 
come to a limit in something an agent “just does,” where this means: does 
without such thought. Of course, whether the regress establishes a limit on 
the application of means-end reason, and the relevant sort of dependence 
of one action on another, will depend on what it is to do something on the 
basis of thought about how to do it. I consider a few interpretations. 
  Deliberation must come to an end. How am I going to get that down from 
there? (My hat is stuck in a tree.) The search for an answer is the search for 
means. I figure, calculate, and deliberate. I work it out: I can get my hat by 
moving that crate over here, climbing up on it, and then hooking the hat 
with this stick. But I don’t know how to move that huge crate. I deliberate 
and work it out: I can do it by doing such-and-such. But then I wonder how 
to do such-and-such. We are off on the regress. Deliberation, as Aristotle 
says, works its way towards things one can do without having to calculate 
out its phases. Indeed, he thinks, deliberation must come to such a limit if (author’s draft – copy editing, formatting etc. still underway) 
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there is to be any action at all. The problem is that “if a person deliberates 
at every point, he will go on for ever.”20 Action will never break out. 
  The viciousness of the regress is sometimes understood along the following 
lines. Figuring out how to do something takes time. And so, if deliberation 
did not come to an end, the performance of any action would involve the 
performance of an infinite number of temporally extended actions, but this is 
absurd: too many actions would be required to do anything at all.21 There is 
another, and, I think, better way to characterize the threat of the deliberative 
regress. Engaging in certain activities presupposes that one takes oneself to 
lack knowledge of a certain kind. Searching for something presupposes an 
unresolved where-question: I do not know where it is; moreover, I know that 
I don’t. Deliberating about how to do something presupposes an unresolved 
how-question: I do not know how to do it; moreover, I know that I don’t. To 
suppose, then, that deliberation does not come to an end is simply to suppose 
that the (self-conscious) lack of knowledge how never comes to an end. It is 
to suppose that an agent is always confronted with an unresolved question 
“How to do A?” Now, roughly speaking, if X is doing A intentionally, then X 
knows how to do A (at the very least, X does not think she lacks such knowledge). 
22 If so, then to suppose that deliberation never comes to an end is to 
suppose that a condition of acting intentionally cannot be met. On this understanding 
of the regress, deliberation must come to an end because one cannot 
act in a state of (self-conscious) ignorance, and not because action would otherwise 
require the performance of an infinite number of actions. In any case, 
I want to accept the result: there must be action which is not preceded or 
accompanied by conscious calculation, if there is to be any action at all. 
  Someone may want to exercise the prerogative of terminology and insist 
that an action performed without first calculating out how to do it be 
called “basic action.” This is fine. What matters for our purposes is only 
whether the regress of deliberation establishes that there must be elementary 
operations in our specifically teleological sense. The crucial question is 
whether it is a condition of acting intentionally and for the sake of an end 
that an agent consciously entertain or reflect on a thought linking action 
and further objective in some conscious act of calculation. But there is no 
such condition. One can intentionally do A in order to do B even though 
one does not consciously reflect on the connection between A-ing and B-ing 
at any moment, either before or during the action. When thinking about the 
operation of means-end reason and the applicability of teleological explanation, (author’s draft – copy editing, formatting etc. still underway) 
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what interests us is not what crosses the mind (of course, yes, there must 
be a limit to this) but, as Anscombe puts it, “an order that is there”—whose 
existence is constituted by various instrumental-rational connections that the 
agent presupposes, and which he presumably could articulate for himself if 
he reflected. 
  Many think, as Aristotle himself seems to think, that precisely where there 
is techn¯e—skill, craft, technique, competence—there is no deliberation. One 
comes to the scene of action in possession of a kind of cognition that eliminates 
the need, or even room, for further inquiry. In Aristotle’s classification 
of intellectual excellences, techn¯e, like the other basic types of cognition, is 
a habitual state (hexis)—something that one has even when asleep and that 
might be exercised on any number of occasions. But, unlike the others, it is 
productive—the exercise of such knowledge is exhibited in individual action 
(poi¯esis) undertaken in particular circumstances.23 And, indeed, the crucial 
point for our purposes is that the course of a skillfully performed action 
is not mediated by conscious calculation. Instead, one’s skill has immediate 
application to the circumstances at hand—one acts straightaway. Nevertheless, 
phases of even the most skillful, unreflective, and routine action can be 
bound together by instrumental rationalization. This is plain where the skill 
is complex, an intelligible unity of other skills, as house building is of foundation 
laying, framing, roofing etc., or pastry baking or ship building are of 
the relevant subordinate capacities. And when a complex skill is exercised, 
these relations of dependence are reflected in the means-end structure of the 
particular action, as when I who, having received the Meilleur Ouvrier de 
France Pˆatisserie, know what’s up with baking a cake, am making the batter 
by beating this butter and sugar in order to bake one for the party tomorrow. 
  Although an argument that there must be skillful action does not take us 
to basic action in our sense—complex skill interferes—it does suggest another 
route. Namely this: to argue that if there are complex skills there must be 
simple ones. And perhaps it is in these that we encounter the necessity of 
basic action? I want to investigate this possibility, though only after it has 
been recast in terms of a distinction, familiar from Jennifer Hornsby, between 
kinds of knowledge how to do something. 
  Procedural knowledge must come to an end. The house builder builds 
houses, and so knows how to do this. We ask, “How do you build a house?” 
Our builder answers, “By laying a foundation, then framing the walls, and 
then . . . . ” The answer describes the way he does this, his method or procedure. (author’s draft – copy editing, formatting etc. still underway) 
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This description of how he builds a house is a further specification of 
what he does: “I build a house by laying a foundation, framing the walls, 
and then . . . . ” And in describing the procedure he expresses knowledge how 
to build a house. Following Hornsby, let’s say that knowledge how to φ is 
procedural knowledge when it can be expressed in the form I φ by ψ-ing. 
Our how-question seeks the articulation of relations of dependence among 
subordinate phases of something one does. Although an answer to it might 
be suitable material for a lecture on the relevant topic, procedural knowledge 
is essentially exhibited in action, not in outward description or inward 
contemplation. Its fundamental deployment is in doing what one knows 
how to do. Procedural knowledge is productive knowledge. In doing what 
one knows how to do, a subject manifests knowledge which can be exercised 
on any number of occasions, and so be manifested in any number 
of individual actions of the relevant type. Procedural knowledge is general 
knowledge. 
  A statement of the form I φ by ψ-ing does not express knowledge how 
to φ unless the subject knows how to ψ. Our house builder’s knowledge 
of subordinate operations—laying a foundation, framing walls, roofing and 
so on—also can be procedural. We press our inquiry, “How do you lay the 
foundation?” He says, “I dig a hole and fill it with concrete.” “And how do 
you . . . ?” The question arises whether there is a limit to an agent’s procedural 
knowledge, and thus a limit to the things one does by means of doing others. 
Experience seems to present plenty of examples of someone who knows 
how to φ, but who does not know anything of the form I φ by ψ-ing. The 
bodily activity of walking is paradigmatic, Hornsby says. Typically someone 
who knows how to walk cannot speak to the question “How do you walk?”, 
and does not know anything that can be expressed as an instance of I walk 
by – -ing. This is so in my own case. Even if I were to consult a physiology 
textbook, learning something of the underlying mechanics of walking, such 
knowledge would not be of the means by which I walk. Although particular 
walks would accord with my new found physiological knowledge, they would 
not be from it: such knowledge would not enter into their account. In contrast, 
my knowledge how to walk, like our builder’s knowledge how to build 
a house, is productive and general: what was exercised in yesterday’s walk 
might be exercised in any number of acts of walking. Following Hornsby, 
let’s say that when such knowledge cannot be expressed in the form I ϕ by 
ψ-ing it is practical knowledge. (author’s draft – copy editing, formatting etc. still underway) 
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  Hornsby does not rest with the observation that there is, in fact, practical 
knowledge. Rather, she argues that there must be such knowledge: 
“Among the things a person knows how to do, some of them he must know how 
to do ‘just like that’, on pain of needing to ascribe to him indefinitely many 
distinct pieces of knowledge to account for his ability”;24 
“Some things—at the end of these ‘by’-chains, as it were—must be done without 
possession of knowledge of procedures. These are things an agent does ‘directly’. 
They are basic things, in one sense of that action-theoretic notion. They are 
things which we are inclined to say the agent is able to simply do.”25 
As before, concern about a regress carves a space for basic action. Hornsby’s 
thought is this: were procedural knowledge the only mode of knowing how 
to do something, it could not reach all the way out to action. It would not be 
productive. So there must be practical knowledge: this is the ultimate source 
of rational efficacy, providing “for our doing all of the things and engaging 
in all of the activities which we do or engage in as agents.”26 And since the 
object of practical knowledge just is basic action, there must be basic action 
if anyone is to do anything at all. 
  Where does this leave us? When someone’s knowledge how to do something 
is not procedural knowledge (is not knowledge how to do such a thing 
by doing other things), it is practical knowledge, and what one knows how 
to do is a basic action. It is crucial to emphasize that what one knows, the 
object of practical knowledge, is a type or form of action. A basic action, in 
the sense at issue in this argument, is an action-type cognized in a certain 
way. It thus has the generality characteristic of such cognition. But now recall 
that our own inquiry has been about the constitution of individual actions or 
performances, “events in a man’s history,” as Anscombe says. Must there be 
an inner limit of the means-end order in the doing of any deed? Anscombe’s 
questions “why?” and “how?” are devices for eliciting a description of the 
phases of individual action. They ask why and how someone is doing or did 
something, in contrast to the how-question (“How do you build a house?”) 
that brought our house builder to express knowledge of how, in general, 
to build a house, of how he does something. There is, then, a gap between 
Hornsby’s thesis that there must be basic actions (concepts)—teleologically 
unstructured conceptions of types of things to do—and any answer to our 
question whether there must be basic actions (deeds)—teleologically unstructured 
doings of things. 
  Although Hornsby’s official description of practical knowledge and basic (author’s draft – copy editing, formatting etc. still underway) 
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action are given in terms of what stops an otherwise vicious regress, we 
should not underestimate the role examples play in putting us in touch 
with the relevant ideas. In addition to bodily activities like walking and 
swimming, Hornsby and others mention pure bodily movements like raising 
an arm, bending a finger, and clenching a fist, as well as such things as 
riding a bicycle, typing, playing a musical instrument and turning left on skis 
which involve objects beyond the limits of the body. A feature of all of these 
examples is the absence of reference to particulars: Hornsby’s basic actions 
do not make mention of names and places, this or that, here and now. 
  The decisive question is whether the individual actions in which an 
agent exercises practical knowledge must themselves lack the structure of 
means-end rationality.27 This question is not settled by the observation that 
there are generic action-types an agent knows how to perform, where this 
knowledge does not rest on knowledge how to perform other generic action-types. 
For it might be that I do not know any general procedure for walking, 
but that nevertheless, when I walk on particular occasions, I perform 
these actions by knowingly taking certain particular means. I want to argue 
that practical knowledge can be exercised in particular actions structured by 
means-end reason. Indeed, my own view is that it must be. When we are 
seduced by the simple argument above, what goes out of view is that general 
knowledge of how to do things is applied in a way that takes account of 
determinate particular circumstances. (It would be interesting to say how 
this could get out of view so easily.) Suppose I exercise my knowledge how 
to walk in walking from this rock here to that tree over there. I can know 
that I have intentionally walked to this point here which is about half-way 
in order to walk to that tree; or again, I can know that part of the way I 
walked to the tree was by walking to this point. And I can know these things 
in virtue of intentionally bringing them about. We might call these items of 
knowledge “knowledge of particular means.” They are means because they 
are (arguably) things I do in order to complete my larger project. They are 
particular because in characterizing them I do not mention any other generic 
act-type except walking, but nevertheless their characterization involves mention 
of more than simply a generic act-type. It involves specifying how, in 
the circumstances at hand, a particular action of that type is constituted 
from its lesser parts. And it is not clear why there must be a limit to such 
specification. Do I not intentionally walk from here to there by intentionally 
walking every inch of the way? (author’s draft – copy editing, formatting etc. still underway) 
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  I am attracted to the thought that any performance manifesting practical 
knowledge must involve drawing on knowledge of particular means in the 
course of realizing an end. This means-end order is not contained in the 
action concept itself, but in material circumstances in which such a concept 
is exercised.When one exercises practical knowledge on a particular occasion 
and thus in particular circumstances, one’s end is not simply the generic end 
of, say, walking, grasping, or turning left on skis, but something with a specific 
telos such as turning left along this path (or through those trees, or before I hit 
that! etc.) grasping this cup, or walking from here to there.28 When making a 
left turn skiing, one does not simply go left in an indivisible instant and one 
does not merely make generic leftward movement. One has to, and, knows 
one has to, turn left somewhere and somehow—turning left is not something 
that can be realized simply per se. Making the turn takes time and essentially 
involves a course of leftward movement: one is already moving downhill and 
faced with an array of possible trajectories, some more or less steep, more or 
less dangerous, and when turning left one charts a course leftward, as it were, 
ordering one’s movement in a certain definite way. Similar points might be 
made about other generic act-types, like walking, grasping, riding a bicycle 
and so on. 
  Finite agents must implement practical knowledge in particular circumstances, 
the particularity of which is known to the agent. We act self-consciously 
on other objects (not just other kinds but other ones) and in 
space and time (not in l and at t, but here and now). These are continuous 
magnitudes. And a subject who moves self-consciously through space, or 
does things that take time, grasps this at least intuitively. If I know that I am 
walking to school, then I know that I need to traverse the entire, continuous 
distance from where I am now to school. I understand the idea of going 
halfway there, and halfway to halfway there, and so on. And this sort of 
understanding supplies a basis for the unlimitedness of rational teleology. 
Perhaps, in every case, there is some most basic generic type of description of 
what I am doing: maybe “walking” or “grasping” is on an occasion the most 
basic of the generic types of action I undertake. Nevertheless, this action 
concept will be determined, in any given case, by other objects as well as 
various spatial and/or temporal detail. When I am walking, I am walking 
from somewhere to somewhere, and in doing this intentionally I act from a 
grasp of what to do in order to get from here to there. This is the structure 
of skillful, concept realization by finite rational beings. Why not?29 (author’s draft – copy editing, formatting etc. still underway) 
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  The preceding sketches an idea about how we might think of the inner 
structure of particular actions. I have tried to make this proposal plausible 
by considering its application to a few simple cases. That is obviously only a 
weak form of argument. But whatever one thinks of this positive proposal, 
the crucial lesson of this section is that the various regress arguments do 
not establish that there must be basic action. In the final section I will give 
a more principled reason for skepticism about whether there can be such a 
thing. 
 
5. Can There be Basic Action? 
It is said that when “X did A” reports an action, someone’s having done 
something intentionally, the subject herself is the source and guide of what 
has happened; she has brought it about, not unwittingly, but knowingly in 
execution of an aim. I take this mixture of familiar metaphors to express 
ideas that are widespread, and that do not belong to some particular theory 
of what it is to act, but to the characterization of the phenomenon of which 
a theory is wanted. The question is whether basic action is adequate to 
them. 
 
“A state of externalization, of alienation” 
In rationally purposeful activity, what is at first only an abstractly envisaged 
end, a glimmer in the eye, something aimed at but not yet there—maybe I’ve 
got it in me to build a sandcastle—develops over time, acquiring concrete 
determinacy as things move along: details are filled in and hammered out, 
flesh is put on the bones, reality accumulates, until finally the job is done and 
the process complete. Success! I did it: I built a sandcastle. The execution of 
a project such as this is making a transition from incomplete to complete, 
from doing to did. It is equally a transition from general representation to 
concrete particular: only when I have built a sandcastle can we refer to my 
act of building a sandcastle, and this act, like the sandcastle itself, is a fully 
determinate, concrete particular, something for which I am responsible— 
maybe I’ve signed or put my stamp on this thing—but that is nevertheless 
now all on its own in the world. The moment of completion is a sort of 
letting go. What fills the gap between incomplete and complete, or general 
and particular, is the progress of the deed, the getting done of what gets done. 
My thought is this: a subject of basic action would be alienated from 
the progress, or getting done, of his deeds, much as Marx understands the (author’s draft – copy editing, formatting etc. still underway) 
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non-worker (Nichtarbeiter) to be alienated from the material processes that 
realize his own ends and fortunes. Imagine the non-worker watching the price 
of his stock rise as the workers on the factory floor churn out widgets: “Now 
I’m really making widgets! Now I’m making some real money!” The nonworker 
lives off the work of others. Marx calls him a parasite and suggests 
that in an important sense he lacks autonomy—not because his ultimate 
ends are merely given to him by something else, but because he does not 
realize what ends he has, however he comes to have them, through his own 
activity. Unlike a parasite such as the whale louse, a crab-like creature found 
on the skin of marine mammals, which knows nothing of the work done by 
its host, Marx’s non-worker might have awareness of the material processes 
that bring actuality to his ends, “the real, practical behavior of the worker in 
production.”30 Yet such awareness would be of something alien, outside and 
external, something given through observation—a matter of being put into 
contact with what is already there. 
  Of course, there is nothing especially disquieting about getting some help 
once in a while: sometimes the way to do something just is to get someone 
to do it for you. In such a case, as one’s agent operates on one’s behalf, 
one is brought closer and closer to the realization of one’s end—destroying a 
rival, perhaps—without willing or even knowing about what constitutes such 
progress: “I don’t want to know how, Scooter. Just take care of it.” Yet orders 
cannot be passed down without end: “Someone’s gotta get his hands dirty.” 
And there would be something especially disquieting about a description of 
our own agency that put us at a similar distance from all the real work, or 
dirty work, as the case may be, fuelling the progress of the deed. 
  The central worry about basic action, then, is that it puts the agent 
in fundamentally the same sort of relation to whatever constitutes such 
progress as Marx’s non-worker is in to the labor process that constitutes the 
transformation of his idea into reality. The underlying sources of change are 
vastly different: it is other human beings who do the work, on the one hand, 
while on the other, the job is metaphysically outsourced to a sub-personal 
workforce.31 Still, in each case, the process of doing something intentionally 
turns out to be a case of delegating tasks to another power. In each case, 
how the process comes to completion is not willed, and at best watched: the 
causal work is not the agent’s work, his knowledge not self-knowledge. 
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The temporality of action 
I want to attempt a plainer, less imagistic attack on the idea of basic action. 
It proceeds simply by describing what such a thing is, an admittedly odd, because 
seemingly too straightforward, strategy. Nevertheless, I suspect certain 
features of philosophical practice and writing—in particular, the tremendous 
reliance on abstract noun phrases (“action”, “event”) and name-like phrases 
(“X’s doing A to Y”, “Y’s A-ing”) in the formulation of general philosophical 
theses—conceal the bad fit with most any pretheoretical characterization 
of the phenomenon of which a theory is wanted. To get the strangeness of 
basic action in view we must have the temporal structure of action properly 
in view, and for this we must return to the grassroots representation of action 
in complete sentences or thoughts. 
Consider the following: 
– I was walking across the street. 
– I walked across the street. 
The subject (first person), predicate (walk across the street) and tense (past) 
are common elements of these thoughts. And yet they are not the same: 
that I was walking across the street does not entail that I walked across the 
street. They differ in aspect. What the proposition with imperfective aspect 
(I was walking across the street) represents as in-progress and underway, 
the correlated proposition with perfective aspect (I walked across the street) 
represents as finished and done. The aspectual distinction is a distinction 
among ways in which subject and predicate can be joined to form a complete 
thought. In this case, where the predicate is walk to school, there is not merely 
a distinction but an opposition between these two modes of predication. 
  To see this we must introduce a further imperfective thought, one reporting 
that things are presently underway: 
– I am walking across the street. 
The aspectual opposition is displayed in this: (i) If I am walking across 
the street, I have not yet walked there; (ii) If I walked across the street, I 
am no longer walking across the street.32 When walking across the street is 
underway, it is not complete; when it is complete, it is underway no more. 
In any one moment, perfective and imperfective aspect (like being and not-being, 
affirmation and denial) shut each other out. And yet (unlike being and 
not-being, affirmation and denial) the poles of the aspectual opposition are 
not simply at odds. Here doing looks forward to having done: when walking 
across the street is in progress, it is not then finished, but nevertheless it (author’s draft – copy editing, formatting etc. still underway) 
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reaches ahead to completion. 
  A present tense judgment such as I am your killer is vulnerable to falsification 
by the actual future (my gun is empty, yours is not), and, in that, 
unlike I am walking across the street, which does not incorporate what will 
actually come to pass into the description of current events. That I am walking 
across the street does not entail that I will ever make it (collision with a 
bus midpoint, alien abduction, change of mind). But if being in progress is 
compatible with never finishing, in what sense does I am walking across the 
street involve the description of the here and now in the light of completion? 
Consider this: I am walking across the street, and then later I am not 
walking across. What happened? There are two possibilities: either I made it 
(and thus could not still be walking across), or else I did not make it (bus 
accident). We have here a distinction between finishing and merely stopping, 
being completed and being left incomplete. But such a distinction is not 
always available where a proposition is true for a while and then false (e.g., I 
am 75kg, and then later I am not 75kg). Still, there is more to looking forward 
to completion than looking forward to a time at which either I did or I did 
not bring things to completion. Finishing and merely stopping are not on 
a par. The concept deployed in the imperfective judgment (walk across the 
street) specifies a terminus or limit, a point beyond which progressive truth 
cannot continue, and only this stopping point is internal to the description of 
the proceedings. That I am walking across the street has intrinsic direction; 
it is a specification of what is to be, even if not what will be in fact. When 
I do not make it (bus accident etc.), we say that things were interrupted 
and cut off, something interfered and got in the way. These expressions, like 
progressive truth itself, presuppose the presence of a real tendency toward 
(and not just idle hope of) eventual completion.33 
  Of course, the aspectual opposition (as well as the corresponding metaphysical 
contrast between things underway and things brought to completion) 
has nothing especially to do with walking across the street, or, quite 
generally, with concepts deployed in action. The predicative material in any 
of the following progress reports generates our opposition: The sun is setting; 
The cherry tree is blooming; The robin is flying to its nest; Jones is baking a 
cake. Indeed, I have been drawing on a tradition reaching back to Aristotle 
whose abstract category of kin¯esis (movement) is specified in aspectual terms: 
very roughly, where a predicate is such as to generate our aspectual opposition 
it expresses a kin¯esis.34 A kin¯esis concept is what figures in propositions (author’s draft – copy editing, formatting etc. still underway) 
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of our three abstract forms (X is doing A, X was doing A, X did A) where 
these have the following inferential relations: If X is doing A, X has not yet 
done A; If X did A, X is no longer doing A. The concepts deployed in action, 
concepts of things to do, are such concepts, and the temporal structure of 
action is that of kin¯esis.35 
  Thus far I have said that action, indeed, kin¯esis (movement) quite generally, 
is either complete or incomplete. Moreover, when one is incomplete, it 
is incomplete by degree (X is just getting going, about half-way done, almost 
there). This is a presupposition of the thought that a kin¯esis is quick, slow 
or some speed: when something is underway there is a rate at which it is 
approaching completion.36 In the typical case, as X is doing A through an 
interval, less and less still needs to be done. Things are coming along. But 
what exactly does such progress consist in? It consists in a connection to 
other events, themselves at various stages of completion. The idea is again 
Aristotle’s: “In their parts and during the time they occupy, all movements 
are incomplete, and are different in kind from the whole movement and from 
each other.”37 When something has begun, is in progress and not yet complete, 
when X is doing A, something else has already been done and other 
things are underway. Indeed, it will be possible to link the process ascription 
“X is doing A” with these others by saying “in that” and then mentioning 
other things that have already happened (a minute ago it did A∗∗), and further 
things that are happening (at the moment it’s doing A∗).38 As before, this is 
a general phenomenon that we find wherever we have events and processes: 
- The house is burning down: the kitchen burned down, the attic is now burning. 
- The cat is stalking a bird: the cat crouched down, the cat is now slinking along. 
- I am baking a cake: I made the frosting and now I’m mixing flour and sugar. 
- I am walking from Athens to Delphi: I walked from Athens to Thebes, now I’m 
walking from Thebes to Delphi. 
The happenings here represented as phases, stages, or parts of an event, 
might in other circumstances be a mere heap. Not just any collection or 
succession of events is a unity: walking from Athens to Thebes and walking 
from Thebes to Delphi would not add up a single event of walking from 
Athens to Delphi were I to get the idea of walking to Delphi only after 
I was already in Thebes. Progressive truth (in this case that I am walking 
from Athens to Delphi) must hang overhead throughout: it is the principle 
of unity of a single event. 
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What happens when someone performs a basic action? 
Against the background of this picture of the temporality of movement 
(kin¯esis) and so specifically intentional movement or action, I now want 
to describe what a basic action would be. It would be a mistake to run 
together the following attempt at illuminating description in light of this 
temporal structure with an attempt to prove the impossibility of basic action 
on the basis of it.39 My thought is simply that when described in light of this 
temporal structure basic action will not be recognizable as action. 
  Suppose X did A and that this is a basic action. It follows from the 
temporal structure of processes that earlier X was doing A and had not 
yet done it. Consider the time, then, when X is doing A. It follows, again 
from the temporality of processes, that other things have already happened 
(X did A∗∗), and still others are underway (X is doing A∗). Indeed, these 
subordinate phases have the same temporal structure. And so, earlier when 
X was doing A∗∗ and had not yet done it, other things had already happened 
(X did A∗∗∗) and still others were underway (X was doing A∗∗∗∗). The action 
in progress (X is doing A) is at once an ever increasing stack of have done’s 
and ever shrinking list of still to do’s. When all goes well, the accumulation 
of subordinate have done’s constitutes the completed action (X did A): the 
subject’s aim of A-ing is materialized in them.40 
  We are supposing that doing A is acting. And so, we are supposing that, 
unlike when the sun is setting or when the tree is falling down, here doing A 
comes from the subject in execution of an aim; the subject is not undergoing 
but bringing about the process, as agent in pursuit of a goal. Moreover, we 
are supposing that, unlike the cat who is stalking a bird or the bird who is 
flying to its nest—both subjects of goal-directed processes—our subject, who 
is doing A intentionally, represents herself through the concept A, not simply 
as something falling under a concept (as she would were she to think that she 
is falling down) but as realizing the concept. In the fundamental case, X is 
not doing A intentionally if she does not know that she herself is doing A, or 
even if she knows this but only on the basis of observation or inference. As 
the agent, she has a special sort of knowledge of what she is doing when she 
is doing it intentionally: it is knowledge “without observation,” as Anscombe 
puts it, a sort of self-knowledge, indeed a specifically productive form of this. 
  Now, since doing A is basic it follows that, at any point during the proceedings, 
what X has already done (A∗∗∗, A∗∗∗∗), and what else X is doing (A∗, 
A∗∗), do not involve anything that is per se an intentional action. By hypothesis, (author’s draft – copy editing, formatting etc. still underway) 
26 
the subordinate phases of a basic action are not themselves undertaken 
in pursuit of the goal. (Indeed, it would seem that were X interrupted, X 
would not have intentionally done anything at all. For whatever X had already 
done would not amount to having done A, but would be only a phase 
of that.) Moreover, if all goes well, nothing that figures in the constitution 
of the whole completed action, none of the phases or proper parts of X’s 
having done A, will be per se intentional actions. The progress of the deed 
toward its completion is thus wholly opaque to its subject, except in the way 
it might be known to an observer or to someone with general knowledge 
of how such things happen. In short, the subject of basic action is alienated 
from the progress of her deed. 
  Earlier we encountered the idea that someone’s action might be ongoing 
when she is asleep or even, as Davidson suggests, dead. This is the causally-dependent, 
or posthumous agency of our naval officer who, already having 
launched the torpedo, is sinking the Bismarck. The subject of basic action 
is in more or less the same situation with respect to the progress of her 
deed. The agency exhibited in a basic action is like the agency exhibited 
in a causally-dependent action with this crucial difference: the period when 
nature is taking its course occupies a different position in the unfolding 
story of the deed. It comes at the beginning, in the first and fundamental 
step, and not later as one waits for the ship to sink, king to die or last 
domino to fall. It looks like performing a basic action is just being the 
subject of a mindless, automatic process which the subject has somehow 
initiated, triggered, or launched. (It would be possible to raise a question 
about what such initiating or triggering could come to, but I will not take up 
that matter here.) It seems the I am doing A of basic action is like the I am 
going to the moon of someone strapped to a rocket labeled “to the moon” 
who has already (somehow) launched the rocket. But, whereas in the case of 
causally-dependent agency, we admitted this as an action precisely because 
we could regard it as a derivative and parasitic case, inheriting its credentials 
from indubitable cases of living, self-governed intentional operation, here 
the alienation infects the basic and fundamental case, that in virtue of which 
anything else is said to be a manifestation of agency at all. 
  When no phase of a process comes knowingly from the subject for the 
sake of the end, what can be the basis for thinking that the process itself, 
the accumulation of such phases, is rationally goal-directed? How, that is, 
could “basic action” qualify as action in the intuitive sense for which we all (author’s draft – copy editing, formatting etc. still underway) 
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want to account, as something the subject brings about, not unwittingly, but 
knowingly in execution of an aim? Heard one way, the following are merely 
reformulations of what defenders of basic action hold to be possible: “I am 
doing A, but I know nothing of how this is getting done” and “I did A, but 
I did not do what was necessary to carry it out.” Heard another way, I hope 
they will sound paradoxical, as though the second clause denies the very 
thing the first asserts. If the latter impression is sound, then “basic action” 
seems not to be action at all. 
 
“The labor of superintendence” 
The capacity to perform a basic action “boils down to a capacity rational 
agents have of getting [something] done without needing to cognitively control 
how it is done.”41 The passage is from Berent Enc¸, who is admirably 
clear-sighted about the need for this sort of commitment. To Enc¸ it seems 
“intuitively clear” that we have this capacity. To me it seems intuitively clear 
that we do not have an intelligible conception of rational agency, if we just 
have something that announces the thing to do, leaving the execution of the 
task to another power. Reason is not practical (i.e. efficacious) if it is simply 
agenda setting in this way: it must also be sufficient to the realization of its 
ends, and thus must be able to constitute the progress of the deed, the getting 
done of what gets done.42 
  Others will want to challenge my characterization of what happens when 
someone performs a basic action. We can imagine the basic action theorist 
responding to the accusation of alienation much as Marx imagines the capitalist 
answering the charge of idleness: “‘Have I myself not worked? Have I 
not performed the labour of superintendence, of overseeing the spinner? And 
does not this labour, too, create value?’”43 The subject of a basic action does 
not merely initiate a material process, as I have suggested, but also, and crucially, 
sustains and guides it toward completion: “In the case of basic action, 
the crucial concept is that of guidance: when an agent A’s intentionally, he 
wants to A, and this desire not only causes but continues to guide behavior 
towards its object.”44 I cannot respond to this suggestion in detail here. Still, 
as a first step, I would want to ask what the guidance of a basic action could 
be, and what role there is, if any, for awareness of the progress of the deed.45 
  For the sake of argument, let’s grant that basic action may be guided 
without awareness of such progress, and thus without awareness of the very 
things in which the progress resides, of what else has already happened and (author’s draft – copy editing, formatting etc. still underway) 
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what else is underway. If the course of a basic action is guided or purposive, 
then the subordinate phases are not merely joined by blind mechanism, like 
the sub-movements of a tree’s falling to the ground, but are elements of a 
teleological structure—each for the sake of the end. Yet, although the agent 
has set it in motion, this purposive accumulation of subordinate phases is 
nevertheless beyond her comprehension. The progress of the deed is nothing 
to her: it has teleological structure in the way that, say, the organic processes 
of digestion do. But if these phases and their connections are not for the 
agent neither is the process as a whole guided by her: where the agent does 
not know of the evolution of the process, she cannot impute it to herself, 
and where she cannot we cannot. 
  Maybe this is too quick? Many will rightly say that “we are generally 
unaware of many portions of the causal process—the activation of efferent 
motor neurons, the contractions of certain muscles—implicated in the production 
of our intentional overt actions.”46 And on this basis, some will 
question whether lack of this awareness undermines the idea that the deed’s 
unfolding constitutes an exercise of agency. But we have to be careful here. 
It is one thing to be unaware of something “implicated in the production” of 
an action; it is another to be unaware of everything going into this. On our 
present supposition, the (putative) agent of a basic action lacks awareness not 
only of, say, underlying physiological processes (muscle contractions, neuron 
firings), but also of the intrinsic articulation in the development from doing 
to did. In thinking of something as, say, moving from one place to another, 
we are already thinking of it as having moved along some sub-path and as 
in the process of moving along others. An action concept of the form move 
from __ to __ contains a partial specification of that through which such 
a thing progresses toward completion, namely processes themselves of the 
form move from __ to __. And the difficulty is with the thought that the 
agent guides (controls, determines, directs, constitutes) the course of action 
without awareness of anything constituting its intrinsic articulation. 
But how might things look were basic action guided with awareness of the 
progress of the deed? Here is Joseph Raz: 
“The element of guidance can be understood by analogy to a negative feedback 
mechanism: we, automatically and normally without being conscious of the fact, 
monitor the performance of the intentional action such that if it deviates from 
the course we implicitly take to lead to its successful completion we correct the 
performance, bringing it back to the correct path, or interrupt it, when we fail (author’s draft – copy editing, formatting etc. still underway) 
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to correct it.”47 
There are two difficulties facing any attempt to supplement our initial story 
of the progress of a basic action with such a conception of guidance. The 
first is about the very possibility of a subject of basic action monitoring its 
progress. Because there are typically many, many ways of realizing an end 
(think of skinning a cat or all the roads to Rome), and because the subject of 
a basic action does not know which specific path things are to take, it does 
not seem that the subject of a supposed basic action could be in a position to 
know that things are going badly until it is too late—that is, until something 
has happened that is flatly incompatible with completion.48 
  Even if we bracket this doubt and suppose that the subject is in a position 
to monitor the proceedings, intervening when necessary, his awareness of 
these proceedings would be by observation. All that goes to constitute his 
intentional progress—what else he is (in some sense) doing—appears to him, 
like the work on Marx’s shop floor, as “theoretical behavior.” And here I 
cannot do more than echo the tradition on which “the essence of passivity 
with respect to an event is witnessing it” and the essence of activity, and 
specifically, productive activity, is knowing an unfolding process in some 
other way.49 Whatever knowledge an agent might have of the progress of 
a basic action it would not be self-knowledge, specifically that form of it 
Anscombe calls practical knowledge—the cause, not the effect of what it 
understands. 
  We can now turn Danto’s original intuition—that a complex action is 
composed of parts that are themselves actions—on its head. If intentional 
actions must be composed fundamentally of basic actions, and if what is 
going on during a basic action is something that is happening automatically 
(albeit perhaps as the result of a process somehow launched and monitored 
by the agent), then it looks as if every intentional action is composed fundamentally 
of phases in which the agent is not intentionally doing anything at 
all, only, as we might put it, waiting hopefully (or perhaps with well grounded 
expectation) for something to be done. So, if a complex action must be composed 
of parts that are themselves actions, and if putatively basic actions are 
not actions at all, then complex actions cannot be composed out of such 
elements. Basic action is not action at all and has no place in an account of 
this topic. 
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